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THE GULF CO-OPERATION COUNCIL'S CAUTIOUS 
APPROACH TO ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 
Robert E. Looney * 
In recent years, there has been an increased realisation among the Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC) countries that their attempts toward economic 
integration were lagging, with little tangible progress made in integrating their 
economies. This has become a matter of great concern, leading them to agree 
to bring forward their plans for a GCC customs union. Specifically, new targets 
were set for unifying customs tariffs at 5 percent by 2003, and introducing a 
single GCC currency by 2010. 
After examining the factors underlying renewed interest in integration, it is 
concluded that the tide of pluses and minuses associated with the formation of 
a customs/monetary union has shifted to the plus side. At the present time, a 
customs union would give the Gulf States greater leverage to attract foreign 
investors and accelerate economic reforms in the region to diversify and further 
stimulate their economies away from oil revenues. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Interest in economic integration on the part of the Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC) countries has changed considerably over time. Initially, 
the Charter signed by Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and 
the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in May 1981 was concerned primarily 
with strengthening the defense of the Arab Gulf region. Specifically, the 
main motivation behind the creat4:m of the GCC was the threat posed to 
regional security by the Iran-Iraq war. Progress towards integration 
among the GCC States has been very slow and, until fairly recently, 
little hope was held for forward movement in this area. Recently, 
however, the situation in the region has heightened the importance of the 
Union (Allen, 2003). There seems to be a growing sense among the 
member States that the long-run economic viability, and thus the 
security of those countries, will be largely determined by their progress 
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in reducing their heavy reliance on oil revenues. In ~urn, this will depend 
on how effectively the member countries are able to remove the many 
remaining hurdles in the way of setting up a customs union capable of 
facilitating efficient industrialisation and meaningful economic 
diversification. An examination of the GCC's track record and of recent 
trends suggests that the time may at last be ripe for economic integration 
among the Gulf States. 
While economics were secondary in the formation of the GCC, the 
GCC Economic Agreement, passed in June 1981, did set out certain 
economic objectives for the fledgling organisation. As noted in the 
Charter; the objectives of the GCC are to effect coordination, integration 
and interconnection between member States in all fields in order to 
achieve unity between them; to deepen and strengthen relations, links 
and scopes of cooperation prevailing between their peoples in various 
fields; to formulate similar regulations in various fields including 
economic and financial affairs, agriculture, industry, commerce, customs 
and communications, education and culture, social and health affairs, 
information and tourism, and legislative and administrative affairs; to 
stimulate scientific and technological progress in various fields, to 
establish scientific research centres and implement common projects, 
and to encourage cooperation by the private sector. 
These general guidelines translate into a series of specific actions: 
• Implementing a free trade area with no barriers on regional 
products and common tariffs on foreign imports; 
• Consolidating bargaining power in negotiations with external 
trading partners; 
• Establishment of a common market that grants citizens the right 
to travel, work, own, and inherit in all member states; 





Adopting a common oil policy; 
Coordinating industrial policy, particularly with respect to 
petroleum based products; 
Promoting joint projects to coordinate chains of production; 
Adopting a common legal framework for regional trade and 
investment; and 
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• An intent to link transportation networks. 
Economic and trade-related objectives were specified in the United 
Economic Agreement (UEA) signed in November 1981. These included 
free trade in all agricultural products, animals, industrial products, and 
natural resources that originated within the member States, the 
introduction of a common external tariff and trade policy, and the 
coordination of economic development within the GCC. 
Since 1981, a number of subordinate bodies have been established to 
implement and achieve the goals of the GCC Charter. These include: (1) 
the Gulf Standards Organisation, established in November 1982, when 
the Saudi Arabian Standards and Measures Organisation was 
transformed into a body serving all GCC members; (2) the Gulf 
Investment Corporation, established in 1984, which has the goal of 
consolidating economic activities of the member countries with regard 
to agricultural, commercial, industrial, mining, and other investments; 
(3) the Patent Office of the GCC, established in December 1992, to 
implement patent regulation for member countries and for the 
authentication and publication of related data; and (4) the Commercial 
Arbitration Center, created in December 1993, to settle trade disputes 
bet\veen GCC citizens and between them and foreigners. 
2. THE DECEMBER 2001 INITIATIVES 
Since the end of the Iran-Iraq conflict in 1988, many observers sensed 
that the GCC had lost some of its sense of direction. Over time, many of 
the goals noted above were modified or sidelined because they impinge 
on national economic sovereignty (Dar and Presley, 2001). Still, 
member States' Foreign Ministers meet in a ministerial council every 
three months. The Heads of States hold annual summits. 
All this seems to have changed with the most recent meeting, held in 
December 2001. Saudi Arabia's Crown Prince Abdullah set the tone in 
the opening session by lamenting the limited progress made by the GCC 
to date: "We are not ashamed to say that we have not been able to 
achieve the objectives we sought when we set up the GCC 20 years 
ago," he said. "We have not yet set up a unified military force that deters 
enemies and supports friends. We have not reached a common market, 
or formulated a unified political position on political crisis. Objectivity 
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and frankness require us to declare that all that has been achieved is too 
little and it reminds us of the bigger part that has yet to be 
accomplished ... We are still moving at a slow pace that does not 
conform with the modem one." And finally: "Our too great attachment 
to the traditional concept of sovereignty is the biggest stumbling block 
hindering unification efforts." 
These statements are certainly borne out by the data. After 20 years 
of operation, the share of intra-regional trade in the GCC has only 
increased from about five percent in 1982 to a little over seven percent 
by 2000. Typically, regional trading groups show intra-regional trade 
above 30 percent of total trade; in the case of the European Union (EU), 
it now exceeds 55 percent. 
Apparently sharing his concern, the member States voted to bring 
forward their plans for a GCC customs union. Specifically, their agreement 
entailed unifying customs tariffs at 5 percent by 2003. In a significant step, 
it was also agreed to introduce a single GCC currency by 2010. 
The decision on unifying customs tariffs at the 5 percent rate 
represents a speeding up of the process approved at the previous GCC 
annual summits. Meeting in Riyadh in 1999, the GCC leaders had 
agreed to postpone the introduction of common tariffs until 2005, a 
decision they confirmed in Bahrain at the end of 2000, when a proposal 
to bring the tariff reduction forward to 2003 was rejected. In effect, this 
tariff unification finally implements the initial economic integration 
agreement between the GCC members. Given the 20 or so years to reach 
this first step toward a customs union, the 2003 deadline facing the 
member countries is truly daunting. 
The GCC Heads of States also agreed in principle that Yemen 
should eventually be allowed to•accede to the Council. Actual Yemeni 
membership of the key GCC institutions remains very far away 
however. The idea has only become conceivable since Saudi Arabia and 
Yemen resolved their border dispute in 2000, and, for the time being, 
Yemen will only join GCC bodies involved with health, education, and 
labour and social affairs. 
Finally, the members agreed to create a monetary union. This is to 
occur in three steps: pegging all national currencies to the dollar within a 
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year, drawing up a legislative framework by 2005, and launching a joint 
currency in 2010. Clearly based on the EU experience, this also presents 
a daunting task for the member countries. 
3. TRADE PATTERNS WITH INTEGRATION 
Progress towards increasing trade between the GCC States has 
generally been limited with several distinct patterns emerging (Annex 
Tables 1, 2). 
Bahrain 
Bahrain actually experienced rapid increases in imports and exports to the 
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Bahrain: Trade Patterns 
- Imports from Industrial Countries 
-- Exports to Industrial Countries 
-- Exports to GCC Countries 
- - - - Imports from GCC Countries 
period the country has had negative growth in both imports and exports to 
the GCC countries. Because the country experienced healthy increases in 
overall imports and exports, the share of imports from the GCC countries 
fell dramatically from 52.74 in the pre-Union period to 37.47 percent by 
1993-2001. Similarly, exports to the GCC countries fell from 27.16 
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percent in the pre-Union period to .7.58 during 1993-2001. Of the GCC 
countries, Bahrain's shift towards increasing imports from the industrial 
countries and away from the GCC is unique (Figure 1 ). 
•, . 
In contrast to Bahrain, Oman has had a considerable expansion in its 
trade with the GCC. In both the pre-and post-Union years, Oman's trade 
with the GCC has increased at a rate considerably above that recorded 
for overall imports and exports. As a result, there has been a marked 
percentage increase in the country's share of trade accounted for by the 
GCC, with exports to the GCC increasing from 0.27 percent of total to 
11.68 percent by the 1990s. Most of this export growth, however, took 
place in the 1990s (Figure 2). In contrast, the share of imports from the 
GCC countries began increasing shortly after the Union, increasing from 
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Kuwait 
Kuwait presents a different trade pattern. Trade with the industrial 
countries has declined in importance slightly over time with import 
shares declining from 73.37 pre-Union to 65.42 percent in the 1990s. 
The corresponding figures for exports were 57.48 to 47.33 percent. 
Exports to the GCC countries, always small, have also declined in 
importance from 4.15 pre-Union to 1.56 percent in the 1990s. 
However, imports from the GCC countries have expanded relatively 
rapidly (Figure 3) at an average annual rate of 11. 77 percent in the 
post-Union years. As a result, the GCC share in Kuwait's total imports 
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Qatar's trade with the GCC countries has some resemblances to that of 
Kuwait (Figure 4). As with Kuwait, GCC trade still accounts for a 
relatively small share of overall imports and exports. Also as in the case 
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of Kuwait, there has been an increased share of imports coming from the 
GCC countries post-Union (6.22 percent post-Union to 13.90 percent in 
the 1990s). Exports to the GCC countries, while not declining, have 
maintained a fairly constant share in the post-Union period (5.26 percent 
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The UAE has had a healthy expansion in trade with the GCC countries 
with imports and exports averaging an annual rate of growth of 10.14 
and 10.63 percent, respectively., in the post-Union period. Ironically, 
these rates are lower than the corresponding 20.79 and 21.84 percent 
rates achieved in the pre-Union years. Because the country's overall 
rates of imports and exports were strong in the post-Union period, there 
has been only a marginal increase (Figure 5) in the shares accounted for 
by the GCC countries-exports increasing from 2.31 percent in the pre-
Union years to 6. 77 percent by the 1990s. Imports actually declined 
from 5.77 percent in the pre-Union period to 5.33 percent in the 1990s 
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Figure 5 
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Saudi Arabia 
Saudi Arabia is by far the largest of the GCC countries, so its 
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amount of intra-group trade. Overall, Saudi trade patterns show a 
resemblance to those of the UAE (Figure 6 vs. Figure 5). Imports and 
exports with the GCC countries have maintained a relatively low share 
in overall trade, with a slight decline in the share of trade with the 
industrial countries. As with the UAE, Saudi Arabian trade with the 
GCC countries, while strong in the post-Union period, was actually 
lower than that experienced in the pre-Union days, with exports 
declining to 5.92 percent annual average growth (from 9.05 percent) and 
imports averaging 5.65 average annual growth in the post-Union period 
as compared to 10.05 percent annual growth in the pre-Union years. As 
a result, exports to the GCC countries increased slightly from 5.23 
percent in the pre-Union days to 6.9 percent in the 1990s. The 
corresponding figures for imports were 2.88 percent of the total in the 
pre-Union period to 3.1 in the 1990s. The increase in Saudi exports to 
the GCC countries also presents an interesting pattern with most of the 
increases going to the UAE (and, to a lesser extent, Kuwait) at the 
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4. CAUSES OF THE SLOW PACE 
Given the current enthusiasm for economic integration, it is a bit of a 
mystery just why the process has proceeded so slowly. Lack of 
significant integration among the GCC countries is commonly attributed 
to their heavy reliance on oil production and export. But the success of 
other commodity exporters, such as Chile, Malaysia, Morocco and 
Turkey, suggests that commodity production in itself does not condemn 
a country to low productivity and an inability to diversify. 
Clearly however, members of the bloc are still facing several trade 
impediments. As Hassan and Antoine-Mehanna (2002, pp. 24-25) note: 
Gulf States have similar factor endowments, small market 
size and their comparative advantage falls in similar 
sectors. They also lack product complementarity among 
each other, and have similar cost and production 
structures along with a narrow export base focused 
mainly on oil, a volatile source of revenue. Gulf countries 
are located in a region full of political conflicts, and the 
large role of government in some GCC States (like Saudi 
Arabia), accompanied by certain restrictions on foreign 
ownership, places a burden on the private sector and 
hampers entrepreneurial initiatives as well as foreign 
capital inflows. All these fundamental constraints hinder 
trade. 
Several additional factors have, no doubt, also impeded integration: 
• The pursuit by key members of incompatible development 
strategies; 
• A fear on the part of several or all of the countries that the 
gains from a customs union would be less than possible 
losses associated with economic integration; 
• Fear of loss in sovereignty associated with the formation of a 
monetary union; 
• Strong, established economic linkages with the EU, US, and 
Japan; 
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• Response to economic shocks; and 
• An evolving public/private economic growth mechanism. 
4.1. Incompatible Development Strategies 
The first explanation stresses the fact that three of the key Gulf 
countries have been pursuing significantly different economic 
strategies. At one end of the spectrum, Saudi Arabia, by far the largest 
Gulf economy, has adopted an import substitution development 
strategy, i.e. the active encouragement by the government of selected 
industries capable of replacing imports and, hopefully, of one day 
developing competitive exports. To this end, the Saudi government has 
given numerous incentives to local producers. Not only has there been 
a wide range of subsidies available, but infant industries are entitled to 
up to 20 percent tariff protection on competing imports. Of the Gulf 
countries, Saudi Arabia is the only economy with a domestic market 
large enough for this strategy to make sense, albeit for a limited 
number of industries. · 
Because of its dwindling oil reserves, Bahrain's trade policy aims at 
eventually replacing 30 percent of its imports with domestic production. 
Here the government actively encourages local entrepreneurs to explore 
joint-venture arrangements with foreign investors to manufacture such 
products as plastic goods, tools, and pharmaceuticals. 
At the other end of the spectrum, the UAE has historically followed 
a free trade policy; before 1994, tariffs on imports were minimal, at one 
percent, and even after 1994 the official tariff remained at four percent, 
much lower than most other GCC States. 
In essence, cooperation over integration would entail Saudi Arabia 
agreeing to a significantly lower tariff for some of its key industries 
and/or the UAE agreeing to a higher rate of protection, thus hurting its 
re-export business to Saudi Arabia. The newly agreed 5 percent common 
tariff suggests that the Saudis are eager for integration to proceed and 
perhaps confident that their import-substituting industries are at the 
stage where less protection is required. 
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4.2. Possible Losses 
While not much progress toward economic integration has been made to 
date, one still gathers that there has been a clear consensus among the 
member countries on the need for some cooperation or coordination to 
minimise the costs of economic change. One problem has been on 
deciding which integration path is optimal for the group as a whole. In 
this regard, there are two main forms of integration: a more general one, 
namely the customs union, and a more specific one, namely the joint-
project approach to sectoral integration. Until recently, most activity had 
been of the joint-project type, with mostly verbal support to the customs 
union. 
That a customs union has been hard to establish may be due to the 
fact that, unlike the joint-project approach, there could be some distinct 
costs borne by the member countries. In fact, in the short run it is not 
entirely clear that the countries as a group would achieve higher levels 
of income through the formation of a customs union. This stems from 
the fact that a customs union has both static (short-term) and dynamic 
(long-term) aspects. In the static sense, a customs union is beneficial if 
its trade creation (stimulation of trade between member countries) 
effects exceed its trade diversion (shifting of trade away from low-cost 
non-member countries). Until recently, it was not at all clear that 
domestic industries could be competitive enough to tip the balance in 
favour of trade creation. Diverting trade from low-cost European, 
Japanese, or U.S. firms to high-cost, local producers most likely would 
have reduced the income of the countries a whole, as has been recently 
documented in a World Bank study of the Latin American trading area 
Mercosur (Yeates, 1998). Some recent evidence from the GCC 
countries (Hassan and Antoine-Mehanna, 2002) suggests that trade 
creation has predominated over trade diversion for the GCC group as a 
whole. • 
In the long term, a customs union could be justified if at least one of 
the following arguments holds: 
a) The public good argument: The development of an individual sector 
is assumed to have certain public good characteristics. It is regarded 
as essential, because health, education, and defence programmes for 
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the industrial sector indirectly contribute to economic development 
and the security of the country. 
b) The economies of scale argument: By forming a customs union, the 
enlarged internal market could be captured by the most efficient 
producer who could lower prices even further because of the 
economies of large-scale production. In the case of the GCC, the 
economies of scale argument is not sufficient to justify economic 
integration unless transport costs and foreign tariffs prohibit exports 
to the rest of the world. The GCC States could produce for domestic 
as well as world markets and, thus, reap economies of scale, such as 
Korea, Taiwan and Singapore have been doing. 
c) The terms of trade argument: A country could improve its terms of 
trade by imposing a tariff on its imports (and tax on exports) if it 
accounts for a sufficiently large portion of world trade to influence 
world prices. Alternatively, it might use its economic power to 
obtain more favourable deals in the economic bargaining process. 
The terms of trade argument is also weak because the GCC States 
are unlikely to be able to influence the world prices of their imports 
or non-oil exports to any significant extent. 
d) The investment creation argument: There is a good chance that 
integration could increase the rate of return to physical capital (in 
addition to other primary factors of production such as the services 
of different types of skilled and unskilled labour). Thus, integration 
in the Gulf could possibly influence the magnitude and character of 
domestic and foreign investment in the member countries. The issue 
here is investment creation vs. investment diversion. That is the 
customs union might induce substantial new investments in the 
member countries as local firms and multinational enterprises seek 
to take advantage of newly-expanded markets (investment creation). 
Potentially there might be benefits derived from all four factors 
noted above. However, of these, the public good argument appears to be 
the strongest, and this is in fact the one most frequently made by the 
GCC governments. 
4.3. Loss of Sovereignty 
Like a customs union, the creation of a monetary union entails potential 
costs and benefits. On the benefit side, the monetary union as currently 
.. , .•: 
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conceived would no doubt result in a reduction in foreign exchange 
transaction costs, promote pricing transparency, and, consequently, 
increased competition. It would, thus, reinforce the positive aspects 
noted above that are associated with the customs union. 
As with the customs union, these benefits come with a cost. 
Specifically, those costs are associated with the loss of national 
sovereignty stemming from the relinquishing of independent control 
over domestic monetary, fiscal, and exchange-rate policy. Here, the 
costs are of two types: first, the psychological cost of not having your 
own currency; and, second, a possible net loss in income due to the lack 
of ability to pursue expansionary monetary and fiscal policy during 
periods of falling oil prices. Of these, the second would seem to 
represent the most serious impediment to economic integration. 
As we have seen in Europe, the formation of a GCC monetary 
union would involve somewhat arbitrary restrictions on national 
budgetary policies. Conceivably, this could significantly infringe on 
member countries' control over their individual taxation and public 
spending programmes. The system would likely impose strict 
budgetary rules and constraints, because an excessive fiscal deficit in 
one individual member country could undermine exchange rate 
stability throughout the whole currency area. Saudi Arabia, for 
instance, might find that it could not expand expenditures during a 
recession to the extent it might prefer, because of the adverse effect it 
might have on, say, Bahrain and Oman. 
In short, as the EU countries have found, a common currency 
requires fairly close economic similarities among the member countries. 
This uniformity does not really exist in the GCC. The question here is, 
are the differences between SauQ.i Arabia and, say, Bahrain so great that 
a common set of macro-economic constraints on both countries might 
not be in their economic interests? 
4.4. Strong, Established Economic Linkages with the EU, US and 
Japan 
As shown in figures, the GCC countries, while perhaps reducing over 
time the share of their trade with the industrial countries, still maintain 
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significant trading shares with these countries. In a detailed examination 
of trade linkages, Mohammad ( 1999) found a set of strong interactions 
between the GCC countries and their major trading partners, EU, US 
and Japan. Furthermore, these interactions between the GCC and its 
major trading partners are strongly influenced by oil prices and growth 
of GDP in the trading partner. The simultaneous-equation regressions 
presented by Mohammad also suggest that GCC imports from each 
trading partner are positively related to the GCC exports to the specific 
partner within a partial adjustment mechanism. The simultaneous 
equation model results also indicate that there are very significant 
feedback effects in GCC trade with US, EU and Japan. Mohammad 
speculates that these feedback effects may be due to the relatively large 
size of total GCC imports from and exports to each of these regions. 
The nature of these linkages provides a strong pull away from intra-
regional trade. These linkages have no doubt created a momentum that, 
everything else equal, has retarded intra-GCC trade. However, the 
declining shares of GCC-industrial country trade suggest that in time 
this momentum can be and has been overcome. 
4.5. Economic Shocks 
International economic shocks have had a contradictory effect on the 
Gulf integration process. "Although external economic pressures have 
likely provided a crucial impetus for cooperation, until recently, 
downturns have also hardened the members' reluctance to forfeit control 
over national economic and trade policy" (Cammett, 1999). Typically, 
during these periods, economic reforms and liberalisation are put on 
hold as the governments attempt to preserve domestic jobs. On the other 
hand, with the creation of a joint currency as part of the formation of a 
monetary union, the GCC countries, because of their similarities, should 
be able to combat and neutrali~e external shocks more effectively 
(Popescu and Mustafa 200, pp. 35-36.) 
4.6. Evolving Public-Private Economic Mechanism 
Related to the external shock factor, the authorities in the GCC countries 
have usually been reluctant during periods of declining oil prices and 
revenues to cut spending because of their concerns regarding the 
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potential adverse effects on non-oil growth. However, when confronted 
with the need to cut spending in periods of declining oil revenues, they 
have often chosen to reduce first capital over current expenditures. An 
IMF study examined these patterns to determine whether there was any 
empirical evidence on the effectiveness of these expenditure patterns in 
stabilising the economy (Fasano and Wang, 2001). The main, somewhat 
counterintuitive finding was the lack of a strong causal relationship 
running from government spending to non-oil growth. Put differently, 
the governments in the GCC countries could, in principle, cut spending 
without negatively affecting non-oil growth. 
No doubt this new public sector expenditure/private output 
relationship reflects structural changes that have been taking place in the 
GCC economies over the last several decades. In particular, it reflects 
the success that many of these countries have had in diversifying their 
economies. A manifestation of this success has been the observed 
weakened structural dependence of non-oil activities on government 
spending in such countries as Saudi Arabia (Looney, 2001). 
These recent findings on the weakening links between government 
expenditure and non-oil output/private sector activity fundamentally 
change the way one looks at the growth prospects for the GCC countries. 
They also have significant implications for the integration process. 
Several years ago, the received conventional wisdom was that the non-oil 
economy simply mirrored the government's fiscal policy, which in turn 
was supported by oil revenues and increased governmental debt. 
Following this logic, the conventional wisdom for development in 
the post oil-boom years was quite pessimistic. Here, the focus was 
usually on budgetary cutbacks, the seeming inability of the government 
to push through economic refoi;ms, increased public sector debt, the 
drying up of credit to the private sector, capital outflow, and declining 
rates of private sector capital formation. The conventional wisdom 
usually concluded that whatever growth occurred was ultimately tied in 
with dwindling government expenditures. Meager rates of non-oil 
private output simply reflected the limits on governmental expenditures. 
In short, the assumption was that loss of governmental borrowing 
capacity and the associated fiscal expenditures would result in a quick 
collapse of the non-oil economy. 
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5. FUTURE PROSPECTS 
The shift over time from strong to weak or non-existent links between 
government expenditures and non-oil private sector activity in the Gulf 
countries no doubt goes a long way in explaining governmental attitudes 
toward economic integration in the region. Initially, government 
expenditures were viewed as indispensable in sustaining economic 
activity and employment. The costs of losing discretionary power over 
fiscal policy were viewed as extremely high, with the benefits of 
integration somewhat problematic. In recent years, the realisation seems 
to have set in that the old fiscal tools have lost much of their stimulus 
power (Dasgupta, Keller and Srinivasan, 2002) and the cost of their loss 
or restriction imposed by a customs or monetary union has become 
much less severe. At the same time, the increased viability of the private 
sector seems to have progressed to the point where it is capable of taking 
advantage of most of the opportunities opened up by the creation of a 
customs and/or monetary union. 
In short, the tide of pluses and minuses associated with the formation 
of a customs/monetary union has shifted to the plus side. At the present 
time, a customs union would give the Gulf States greater leverage to 
attract foreign investors and accelerate economic reforms in the region 
to diversify and further stimulate their economies away from oil 
revenues. An added impetus for the formation of a customs union has 
come from the European Community (EC). As part of its policy to 
encourage the formation of regional trade blocks in the developing 
world, the EC has urged the Gulf States to implement a unified external 
tariff, making a comprehensive trade agreement with the Gulf States 
contingent on this action. 
The losses associated with. integration, while still present, are 
unlikely to offset these benefits. If this interpretation is correct, the push 
for economic union should be strong enough to overcome any remaining 
impediments. 
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Annex Table 1. Growth of GCC Trade: 1974-2001 
(average annual percentage growth) 
Pre-Union Post-Union Post-Union I Post-Union II 
1974-1983 1984-2001 1984-1994 1994-2001 
Bahrain 
Total Exports 10.8 6.16 1.91 13.3 
Industrial Countries -0.17 1.79 -2.19 13.98 
GCC 15.39 -3.19 -8.21 2.11 
Total Imports 12.79 0.26 2.28 -0.3 
Industrial Countries 19.84 0.79 2.46 0.61 
GCC 8.71 -1.62 -1.11 -1.89 
Oman 
Total Exports 15.69 5.84 3.53 9.26 
Industrial Countries 12.2 0.71 -4.6 4.37 
GCC 30.63 27.56 49.49 6.19 
Total Imports 22.81 4.52 4.59 5.84 
Industrial Countries 25.2 2.28 1.95 4.3 
GCC, 19.49 8.06 11.16 6.11 
Kuwait 
Total Exports 1.24 2.49 -3.14 9.99 
Industrial Countries -2.63 2.14 -0.88 7.16 
GCC 18.56 -3.24 -13.32 8.75 
Total Imports 18.87 0.76 0.21 2.24 
Industrial Countries 20.43 -0.48 0.02 1.28 
GCC 28.56 11.77 13.5 7.25 
Qatar 
Total Exports 13.97 6.39 -4.64 23.56 
Industrial Countries 12.88 3.92 -5.58 18.62 
GCC 24.25 11.51 8.06 17.28 
Total Imports 20.54 7.56 5.56 10.54 
Industrial Countries 23.04 7.3 4.25 11.67 
GCC 7.11 • 15.77 24.12 7.79 
UAE 
Total Exports 11.98 6.3 5.84 5.6 
Industrial Countries 5.12 4.22 2.93 6.7 
GCC 20.79 10.14 12.26 6.86 
Total Imports 18.73 11.21 11.99 9.52 
Industrial Countries 20.32 8.76 7.32 7.9 
GCC 21.84 10.63 4.65 19.4 
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Saudi Arabia 
Total Exports 4.36 3.78 1.37 7.45 
Industrial Countries 3.14 2.81 -1.31 5.38 
GCC 9.05 5.92 6.33 5.72 
Total Imports 33.76 0.94 -1.96 7.81 
Industrial Countries 39.78 -0.36 -2.88 5.72 
GCC 10.05 5.65 4.18 7.77 
Compiled from: International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook: 
2002 (Washington: IMF, 2002), for 1995-2001; Arab Monetary Fund, Foreign Trade 
of Arab Countries, various issues for 1974-1994. 
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Annex Table 2. Patterns of GCC Trade: 1974-2001 
(percent share of total imports/exports) 
Total Period Pre-Union Post-Union Present 
1974-2001 1974-1981 . 1981-1992 1993-2001 
Bahrain 
% Total Exoorts 
Industrial Countries 21.86 35.88 20.17 11.89 
GCC Countries 17.28 27.16 19.13 7.58 
% Total Imports 
Industrial Countries 41.20 35 .71 41.91 44.99 
GCC Countries 44.65 52.74 46.80 37.47 
Oman 
% Total Exoorts 
Industrial Countries 49.45 87.85 41.93 29.43 
GCC Countries 14.35 0.27 27.09 11.68 
% Total Imports 
Industrial Countries 60.25 63.67 64.56 52.55 
GCC Countries 25.33 20.83 22.81 31.25 
Kuwait 
% Total Exports 
Industrial Countries 49.60 57.48 47.19 47.33 
GCC Countries 2.93 ' 4 .15 3.15 1.56 
% Total Imports 
Industrial Countries 69.80 73.37 70.92 65.42 
GCC Cowttries 5.34 0.66 4.72 10.18 
Oatar 
% Total Exports 
Industrial Countries 66.18 79.43 64.41 59.30 
GCC Countries 4.31 1.38 5.26 5.34 
% Total Exports • 
Industrial Countries 72.45 78.41 72.90 66.23 
GCC Countries 8.66 6.22 5.70 13.90 
UAE 
% Total Exports 
Industrial Countries 56.13 82.76 52.42 41.92 
GCC Countries 4.65 2.31 4.24 6.77 
% Total Imports 
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Industrial Countries 63.67 70.77 66.88 53.92 
GCC Countries 5.65 5.77 5.99 5.33 
Saudi Arabia 
% Total Exports 
Industrial Countries 62.43 70.19 64.20 54.34 
GCC Countries 5.23 2.27 5.70 6.90 
UAE 20.26 1.76 15.13 39.55 
Oman 1.98 0.91 1.22 3.61 
Bahrain 65.80 94.37 71.17 39.37 
Oatar 2.73 0.67 2.63 4.36 
Kuwait 9.22 2.29 9.85 13.12 
100,00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
% Total Imoorts 
Industrial Countries 74.24 70.82 77.82 70.74 
GCC Countries 2.88 4.75 l.77 3.10 
, , 
UAE 33.74 12.22 33.48 48.74 
Oman 4.42 0.81 3.46 8.04 
Bahrain 23.37 23.85 23.49 23.70 
Qatar 12.05 9.24 15.06 9.74 
Kuwait 26.42 53.88 24.51 9.78 
100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Compiled from: International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook: 
2002 (Washington: IMF, 2002), fOT 1995-2001~.Arab Monetary Fund, Foreign Trade 
of Arab Countries, various issues for 1974-1994 . 
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